Ashua
Member
The grand conception of the virtuous “philosopher-king” centers around the idea of “the good” and the subjectivity in its interpretation; but what is this “good” that Plato speaks of? —or more precisely: Why is it good? For Plato speaks of justice, and of the good in terms of absolute parameters, but he neglects to establish an objective, definitive origin for the canon of moral law. To suppose that goodness, in and of itself, is some abstract caricature portraying the intrinsic will of the universe, is to preclude any semblance of rational thought; that is, how could the faceless universe be so inclined toward partisanship in respect to the human condition?...Nor does he attribute the legislation of morality to be the prerogative of a sovereign creator. Perhaps, Plato carelessly mistook the postulate of moral absolutism for a given, considering his regard for the Greek logicians of old, and their philosophical experimentation with geometrical proofs. Still, the problem arises: What is the qualification for defining the good?
The authority to determine—the inherent blessing of nature's endorsement, which man, from his inception has sought to swindle, seemingly exceeds the bounty of his providential dowry. Notwithstanding, the age-old campaign of mankind's failure to establish a legitimate claim to authority—to declare good and evil in absolute terms, but for one to yoke such prejudices upon the backs of his brethren is utterly inequitable; howbeit even the “nobility” behind such a concept as equity is purely illusory...And from where is this imperialistic will to impute the moral code of the dominant, upon the many derived? For we say, this is just, and that is unjust; but who is the great decider of terms, dividing virtue from vice?
The deterrent presented with the doctrine of moral arbitration lies in the necessity for an arbiter, but what dogmatist is supremely endowed with the divine lot to impose upon all, his philosophical vanity, polluted with cultural pretense? For if we accept that one man—or even that a governing body is sufficiently fit to draft the boarders of our ethical provinces, with [the] intent that all should abide therein, then we sell ourselves into philosophical slavery, thus ignorantly conceding that the vision of one is inferior to that of another, though it be no less a novelty of the human imagination.
Inevitably, there rises up an advocacy for the law to assume the objective office of moral mediator. This too, must be rejected—for what is law, but the precept of man? The truth behind the messianic vision of Platonism is little more than a phantasmagoria of Hellenistic prejudices and aggrandized opinions, [which are] crafted after the fickle fashions of a temporal generation—Opinion masquerading as innate truth: So it is that our problem remains unresolved hitherto.
However, Cicero deserves commendation, for unlike Socrates, he did not shrink away from confronting the question: From whence comes the central authority to arbitrate the universal constitution of good and evil? Cicero adopts a worthy supposition to vindicate the doctrine of moral absolutism, for he says: “there exists a Universal Monarch in heaven,...who is both king and father of all creatures.” Thus, he declares that the legislation of “nature's law” is indeed the prerogative of a sovereign creator who bears legitimate claim to appoint an eternal ordinance over all creation—His handiwork. Verily, every moral order is vanity apart from the signet of an Almighty creator, for without—the currency of virtue is human opinion—meted out in temporal prejudices and demagoguery; for such doctrines remain unbacked in transcendent stock. Though he neglects to identify the creator or the precise canon of moral law, in the least, one fitting such a profile as described by the Roman philosopher qualifies as being both beyond man and of legitimate merit to reign over him—Exceeding in power and justified by deed of authorship. Thus it seems that the abstraction of definitive good and evil is wholly contingent upon the existence of God—the arbiter of morality.
The authority to determine—the inherent blessing of nature's endorsement, which man, from his inception has sought to swindle, seemingly exceeds the bounty of his providential dowry. Notwithstanding, the age-old campaign of mankind's failure to establish a legitimate claim to authority—to declare good and evil in absolute terms, but for one to yoke such prejudices upon the backs of his brethren is utterly inequitable; howbeit even the “nobility” behind such a concept as equity is purely illusory...And from where is this imperialistic will to impute the moral code of the dominant, upon the many derived? For we say, this is just, and that is unjust; but who is the great decider of terms, dividing virtue from vice?
The deterrent presented with the doctrine of moral arbitration lies in the necessity for an arbiter, but what dogmatist is supremely endowed with the divine lot to impose upon all, his philosophical vanity, polluted with cultural pretense? For if we accept that one man—or even that a governing body is sufficiently fit to draft the boarders of our ethical provinces, with [the] intent that all should abide therein, then we sell ourselves into philosophical slavery, thus ignorantly conceding that the vision of one is inferior to that of another, though it be no less a novelty of the human imagination.
Inevitably, there rises up an advocacy for the law to assume the objective office of moral mediator. This too, must be rejected—for what is law, but the precept of man? The truth behind the messianic vision of Platonism is little more than a phantasmagoria of Hellenistic prejudices and aggrandized opinions, [which are] crafted after the fickle fashions of a temporal generation—Opinion masquerading as innate truth: So it is that our problem remains unresolved hitherto.
However, Cicero deserves commendation, for unlike Socrates, he did not shrink away from confronting the question: From whence comes the central authority to arbitrate the universal constitution of good and evil? Cicero adopts a worthy supposition to vindicate the doctrine of moral absolutism, for he says: “there exists a Universal Monarch in heaven,...who is both king and father of all creatures.” Thus, he declares that the legislation of “nature's law” is indeed the prerogative of a sovereign creator who bears legitimate claim to appoint an eternal ordinance over all creation—His handiwork. Verily, every moral order is vanity apart from the signet of an Almighty creator, for without—the currency of virtue is human opinion—meted out in temporal prejudices and demagoguery; for such doctrines remain unbacked in transcendent stock. Though he neglects to identify the creator or the precise canon of moral law, in the least, one fitting such a profile as described by the Roman philosopher qualifies as being both beyond man and of legitimate merit to reign over him—Exceeding in power and justified by deed of authorship. Thus it seems that the abstraction of definitive good and evil is wholly contingent upon the existence of God—the arbiter of morality.
Last edited by a moderator:
