Then it is your desire, but you should consider, if you haven't already, what is the source of your desire?
Why we chose God
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Desire to be a vessel of honor unto the Lord Jesus Christ?
Join For His Glory for a discussion on how
https://christianforums.net/threads/a-vessel-of-honor.110278/
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Taking the time to pray? Christ is the answer in times of need
https://christianforums.net/threads/psalm-70-1-save-me-o-god-lord-help-me-now.108509/
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Then it is your desire, but you should consider, if you haven't already, what is the source of your desire?
That's a nice thought, but think about the "will" for just a bit. The will is motivated by the desire, ones volition to act. Our desire is the only thing we can call free if we in fact have free will. So if God places a desire for Him in all of us, but some don't choose Him. Then They can't not choose Him freely because they are acting against their own will.
Yes we do, & if we act contrary to our desire, that's not being free at all is it. That is acting against our free will.
So are we saying Abraham, Moses, Paul, etc had the choice to yield to Lord's call?
John 15:16 - You did not choose me, but I chose you and appointed you so that you might go and bear fruit—fruit that will last—and so that whatever you ask in my name the Father will give you.
I desire to sleep with my fiance but I choose not to. I desire to punch some people in the face but I choose not to. Acting counter to desire is not acting counter to free will, it is the expression to free will.
Exactly, but it's not free will because you are describing what your will is & not acting on it. Why? Because the will of God is in you. So, your will wants to do the things you say. But Gods will for you keeps you from it. Your will is limited to that which you desire, & if not for God ( not your will) you would only have your own will, but because of God, you yield to Gods will.
Why do people reject God? Because it is there will to do so. Gods justice is on mans will & His justice is obligatory for all, but his mercy is not obligatory. He owes no man anything & no man has ever done anything willfully to earn Gods mercy, only his justice.
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But I am free to act on it. I could have used the example, I desire to give money to the homeless man down the road but choose not to. Desires and choice, 2 very different things. Free will, as I see it, is the ability to choose which to follow; to follow the desire or not to follow the desire. It may be Gods will not for me to sleep with my fiance but if I choose to, I can. It's God will that I do, it's my will that I don't, I choose to follow Gods. I think we have different definitions/concepts of free will.
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Yes. Well, the word "FREE" is problematic in your definition of making an active "choice" by your own will. Because a persons WILL, is their desire. Look up the word "WILL". So therefore, let's not say that you desire one thing but do another by your own FREE will, because it's not reasonable, rational, or logical to say it is free at all in doing something contrary to what you desire. Your "free will" is limited to sin. Such is the case of all man. Without Gods intervention and choice of you, you would be left to your free will. Thank God your not.
Yes. Well, the word "FREE" is problematic in your definition of making an active "choice" by your own will. Because a persons WILL, is their desire. Look up the word "WILL". So therefore, let's not say that you desire one thing but do another by your own FREE will, because it's not reasonable, rational, or logical to say it is free at all in doing something contrary to what you desire. Your "free will" is limited to sin. Such is the case of all man. Without Gods intervention and choice of you, you would be left to your free will. Thank God your not.
So let me just ask a basic question linked to all this. Under your definition of free will, did I freely choose to allow God into my life?
Humans have a strong sense of freedom, which leads us to believe that we have free will.<sup id="cite_ref-5" class="reference">[5]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-6" class="reference">[6]</sup> An intuitive feeling of free will could, however, be mistaken.<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister2_7-0" class="reference">[7]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-Clark_8-0" class="reference">[8]</sup> It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical law.<sup id="cite_ref-Velmans2002_9-0" class="reference">[9]</sup> This problem is most evident when either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). The need to reconcile freedom of will with a deterministic universe is known as the problem of free will or sometimes referred to as the dilemma of determinism.<sup id="cite_ref-WJames_10-0" class="reference">[10]</sup> This dilemma leads to a moral dilemma as well: How are we to assign responsibility for our actions if they are caused entirely by past events?<sup id="cite_ref-Bargh_11-0" class="reference">[11]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-Russell_12-0" class="reference">[12]</sup>
Classical compatibilists have addressed the dilemma of free will by arguing that free will holds as long as we are not externally constrained or coerced.<sup id="cite_ref-strawson_13-0" class="reference">[13]</sup> Modern compatibilists make a distinction between freedom of will and freedom of action, that is, separating freedom of choice from the freedom to enact it.<sup id="cite_ref-OConnor_14-0" class="reference">[14]</sup> Given that humans all experience a sense of free will, some modern compatibilists think it is necessary to accommodate this intuition.<sup id="cite_ref-Greene_15-0" class="reference">[15]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-Freeman1_16-0" class="reference">[16]</sup> For example, some modern compatibilists in psychology have tried to revive traditionally accepted struggles of free will with the formation of character.<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister0_17-0" class="reference">[17]</sup> Compatibilist free will has also been attributed to our natural sense of agency, where one must believe they are an agent in order to function and develop a theory of mind.<sup id="cite_ref-Smilansky2000_18-0" class="reference">[18]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-19" class="reference">[19]</sup>
A different approach to the dilemma is that of incompatibilists, namely, that if the world is deterministic then, our feeling that we are free to choose an action is simply an illusion. Fundamental debate continues over whether the physical universe is in fact deterministic. Physical models offered at present are both deterministic and indeterministic, and are subject to interpretations of quantum mechanics - which themselves are being constrained by ongoing experimentation.<sup id="cite_ref-GroblacherPaterek2007_20-0" class="reference">[20]</sup> Yet even with physical indeterminism, arguments have been made against the feasibility of incompatibilist free will in that it is difficult to assign Origination (responsibility for "free" indeterministic choices).
Despite our attempts to understand nature, a complete understanding of reality remains open to philosophical speculation. For example, the laws of physics (deterministic or not) have yet to resolve the hard problem of consciousness:<sup id="cite_ref-Kalat_21-0" class="reference">[21]</sup> "Solving the hard problem of consciousness involves determining how physiological processes such as ions flowing across the nerve membrane cause us to have experiences."<sup id="cite_ref-Goldstein_22-0" class="reference">[22]</sup> According to some, "Intricately related to the hard problem of consciousness, the hard problem of free will represents the core problem of conscious free will: Does conscious volition impact the material world?"<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister2_7-1" class="reference">[7]</sup> Although incompatibilist metaphysical libertarianism generally represents the bulk of non-materialist constructions,<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister2_7-2" class="reference">[7]</sup> including the popular claim of being able to consciously veto an action or competing desire,<sup id="cite_ref-Libet_2003_23-0" class="reference">[23]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-RKane1_24-0" class="reference">[24]</sup> compatibilist theories have been developed based on a form of identity dualism in which "the experience of conscious free will is the first-person perspective of the neural correlates of choosing".<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister2_7-3" class="reference">[7]</sup> It is however apparent that, even disregarding the hard problem of consciousness, "consciousness plays a far smaller role in human life than Western culture has tended to believe."<sup id="cite_ref-illusion_25-0" class="reference">[25]</sup>
Free will here is predominately treated with respect to physical determinism in the strict sense of nomological determinism, although other forms of determinism are also relevant to free will.<sup id="cite_ref-stanfordincompatibilismarguments_26-0" class="reference">[26]</sup> For example, logical and theological determinism challenge metaphysical libertarianism with ideas of destiny and fate, and biological, cultural and psychological determinism feed the development of compatibilist models. Separate classes of compatibilism and incompatibilism may even be formed to represent these.<sup id="cite_ref-stanfordforeknowledge_27-0" class="reference">[27]</sup>
<sup id="cite_ref-stanfordforeknowledge_27-0" class="reference">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will#cite_note-stanfordforeknowledge-27</sup>
<sup id="cite_ref-stanfordforeknowledge_27-0" class="reference">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will#In_Western_philosophy
</sup>
Classical compatibilists have addressed the dilemma of free will by arguing that free will holds as long as we are not externally constrained or coerced.<sup id="cite_ref-strawson_13-0" class="reference">[13]</sup> Modern compatibilists make a distinction between freedom of will and freedom of action, that is, separating freedom of choice from the freedom to enact it.<sup id="cite_ref-OConnor_14-0" class="reference">[14]</sup> Given that humans all experience a sense of free will, some modern compatibilists think it is necessary to accommodate this intuition.<sup id="cite_ref-Greene_15-0" class="reference">[15]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-Freeman1_16-0" class="reference">[16]</sup> For example, some modern compatibilists in psychology have tried to revive traditionally accepted struggles of free will with the formation of character.<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister0_17-0" class="reference">[17]</sup> Compatibilist free will has also been attributed to our natural sense of agency, where one must believe they are an agent in order to function and develop a theory of mind.<sup id="cite_ref-Smilansky2000_18-0" class="reference">[18]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-19" class="reference">[19]</sup>
A different approach to the dilemma is that of incompatibilists, namely, that if the world is deterministic then, our feeling that we are free to choose an action is simply an illusion. Fundamental debate continues over whether the physical universe is in fact deterministic. Physical models offered at present are both deterministic and indeterministic, and are subject to interpretations of quantum mechanics - which themselves are being constrained by ongoing experimentation.<sup id="cite_ref-GroblacherPaterek2007_20-0" class="reference">[20]</sup> Yet even with physical indeterminism, arguments have been made against the feasibility of incompatibilist free will in that it is difficult to assign Origination (responsibility for "free" indeterministic choices).
Despite our attempts to understand nature, a complete understanding of reality remains open to philosophical speculation. For example, the laws of physics (deterministic or not) have yet to resolve the hard problem of consciousness:<sup id="cite_ref-Kalat_21-0" class="reference">[21]</sup> "Solving the hard problem of consciousness involves determining how physiological processes such as ions flowing across the nerve membrane cause us to have experiences."<sup id="cite_ref-Goldstein_22-0" class="reference">[22]</sup> According to some, "Intricately related to the hard problem of consciousness, the hard problem of free will represents the core problem of conscious free will: Does conscious volition impact the material world?"<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister2_7-1" class="reference">[7]</sup> Although incompatibilist metaphysical libertarianism generally represents the bulk of non-materialist constructions,<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister2_7-2" class="reference">[7]</sup> including the popular claim of being able to consciously veto an action or competing desire,<sup id="cite_ref-Libet_2003_23-0" class="reference">[23]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-RKane1_24-0" class="reference">[24]</sup> compatibilist theories have been developed based on a form of identity dualism in which "the experience of conscious free will is the first-person perspective of the neural correlates of choosing".<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister2_7-3" class="reference">[7]</sup> It is however apparent that, even disregarding the hard problem of consciousness, "consciousness plays a far smaller role in human life than Western culture has tended to believe."<sup id="cite_ref-illusion_25-0" class="reference">[25]</sup>
Free will here is predominately treated with respect to physical determinism in the strict sense of nomological determinism, although other forms of determinism are also relevant to free will.<sup id="cite_ref-stanfordincompatibilismarguments_26-0" class="reference">[26]</sup> For example, logical and theological determinism challenge metaphysical libertarianism with ideas of destiny and fate, and biological, cultural and psychological determinism feed the development of compatibilist models. Separate classes of compatibilism and incompatibilism may even be formed to represent these.<sup id="cite_ref-stanfordforeknowledge_27-0" class="reference">[27]</sup>
<sup id="cite_ref-stanfordforeknowledge_27-0" class="reference">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will#cite_note-stanfordforeknowledge-27</sup>
<sup id="cite_ref-stanfordforeknowledge_27-0" class="reference">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will#In_Western_philosophy
</sup>
There are extremes on both sides. There are those who emphasize the God's sovereignty so strongly they make us little more than robots bending to God's sovereign programming, with no choice but to do as He directs. Others make the mistake of taking control and knowledge out of God's purview, emphasizing our own free will so that He is powerless. Neither of these positions is biblical.Yes. Well, the word "FREE" is problematic in your definition of making an active "choice" by your own will. Because a persons WILL, is their desire. Look up the word "WILL". So therefore, let's not say that you desire one thing but do another by your own FREE will, because it's not reasonable, rational, or logical to say it is free at all in doing something contrary to what you desire. Your "free will" is limited to sin. Such is the case of all man. Without Gods intervention and choice of you, you would be left to your free will. Thank God your not.
God will not violate our free will in the redemption process. By the evidence the Holy Spirit presents to us through his drawing, calling and inspiration, He changes our hearts so that our wills choose Him. “We love, because He first loved us†(1 John 4:19), and “You did not choose me, but I chose you†(John 15:16). Neither of those indicate we have no choice in the matter, only that God calls us to Him. The argument by extreme Calvinists that He does not call all men is just as ludicrous as the argument by the extreme Arminians that once we have accepted Christ's invitation to us, we can nullify and lose His saving grace. Neither is even remotely supported in the Bible.
What are we to do then? First, we are to trust in the Lord, knowing that He is in control (Proverbs 3:5-6). God’s sovereignty is supposed to be a comfort to us, not an issue to be concerned about or debate over. Second, we are to live our lives making wise decisions in accordance with God’s Word (2 Timothy 3:16-17; James 1:5). There will be no excuses before God for why we chose to disobey Him. We will have no one to blame but ourselves for our sin. Last but not least, we are to worship the Lord, praising Him that He is so wonderful, infinite, powerful, full of grace and mercy -- and sovereign.
The only "free" choice we have is to sin freely, but we are not free in sin. Rather we are in bondage to our own freedom of our own will. Our Free choice is limited to sin. We can choose sin, but because of this we will not choose God "freely", rather God chooses us, and he chooses whom he will. Unfair? Not at all, because all deserve justice and all would receive justice if not for some given grace. No man is in any position to argue with His creator on this point. So then some might say, if God chooses us and we do not freely choose Him, then aren't we then slaves to Him? Puppets for God? Are we not then not free? Yes and No! We are free FROM our bondage to freely sin, and we are slaves to God's righteousness, and we are so willingly .
The "will" of man changes once he is saved. The old will only knew sin. The new will is the spirit of God which the old will yields to. And so even though the old will still desires to sin and sin freely, it is held captive by God. Thank God it is. This is our conversion.
We are getting into some heavy theology here, but let me just quote our Lord to better answer your question. John 14:6 6 Jesus answered, “I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me. John 6:37 37 All those the Father gives me will come to me, and whoever comes to me I will never drive away.
I can not say for you, but I did not choose God. I rejected Him freely. It was not until God found me that I knew Him at all, and I'm so glad He did. Who am I to know His love? I'm nobody. That is why He is anything to me, because He loved me before I could have ever loved Him.
I don't see anything in that passage that says God has already decided who will and won't believe in him. We can choose him and if we do, we are given to Christ.
You realize that the Greek erchomai carries the implication of free will? it's definition is "to come" but in the sense of making the decision to come, to go, to follow. The co-existence of God's sovereignty and man's free will cannot be denied, though man's will must become conformed to God's will in order to follow, or come. No less than Spurgeon admitted the same thing.
I made an excellent point too. Care to answer me?
Sure. Yours deserves more response. I'm at the Dr office but I'll respond ASAP. Hard to type on an IPhone