Humans have a strong sense of freedom, which leads us to believe that we have free will.<sup id="cite_ref-5" class="reference">
[5]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-6" class="reference">
[6]</sup> An intuitive feeling of free will could, however, be mistaken.<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister2_7-0" class="reference">
[7]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-Clark_8-0" class="reference">
[8]</sup> It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by
physical law.<sup id="cite_ref-Velmans2002_9-0" class="reference">
[9]</sup> This problem is most evident when either
causal closure or
physical determinism (
nomological determinism) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). The need to reconcile freedom of will with a deterministic universe is known as the
problem of free will or sometimes referred to as the
dilemma of determinism.<sup id="cite_ref-WJames_10-0" class="reference">
[10]</sup> This dilemma leads to a
moral dilemma as well: How are we to assign
responsibility for our actions if they are caused entirely by past events?<sup id="cite_ref-Bargh_11-0" class="reference">
[11]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-Russell_12-0" class="reference">
[12]</sup>
Classical
compatibilists have addressed the dilemma of free will by arguing that free will holds as long as we are not externally constrained or coerced.<sup id="cite_ref-strawson_13-0" class="reference">
[13]</sup> Modern compatibilists make a distinction between freedom of will and freedom of
action, that is, separating freedom of choice from the freedom to enact it.<sup id="cite_ref-OConnor_14-0" class="reference">
[14]</sup> Given that humans all experience a sense of free will, some modern compatibilists think it is necessary to accommodate this intuition.<sup id="cite_ref-Greene_15-0" class="reference">
[15]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-Freeman1_16-0" class="reference">
[16]</sup> For example, some modern compatibilists in
psychology have tried to revive traditionally accepted struggles of free will with the formation of character.<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister0_17-0" class="reference">
[17]</sup> Compatibilist free will has also been attributed to our natural
sense of agency, where one must believe they are an agent in order to function and develop a
theory of mind.<sup id="cite_ref-Smilansky2000_18-0" class="reference">
[18]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-19" class="reference">
[19]</sup>
A different approach to the dilemma is that of
incompatibilists, namely, that if the world is deterministic then, our feeling that we are free to choose an action is simply an
illusion. Fundamental debate continues over whether the physical universe is in fact
deterministic. Physical models offered at present are both
deterministic and
indeterministic, and are subject to
interpretations of
quantum mechanics - which themselves are being constrained by ongoing experimentation.<sup id="cite_ref-GroblacherPaterek2007_20-0" class="reference">
[20]</sup> Yet even with physical indeterminism, arguments have been made against the feasibility of incompatibilist free will in that it is difficult to assign
Origination (responsibility for "free" indeterministic choices).
Despite our attempts to understand nature, a complete understanding of reality remains open to philosophical speculation. For example, the
laws of physics (deterministic or not) have yet to resolve the
hard problem of consciousness:<sup id="cite_ref-Kalat_21-0" class="reference">
[21]</sup> "Solving the hard problem of consciousness involves determining how physiological processes such as ions flowing across the nerve membrane
cause us to have experiences."<sup id="cite_ref-Goldstein_22-0" class="reference">
[22]</sup> According to some, "Intricately related to the hard problem of consciousness, the hard problem of free will represents
the core problem of conscious free will: Does conscious volition impact the material world?"<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister2_7-1" class="reference">
[7]</sup> Although incompatibilist
metaphysical libertarianism generally represents the bulk of
non-materialist constructions,<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister2_7-2" class="reference">
[7]</sup> including the popular claim of being able to consciously veto an action or competing desire,<sup id="cite_ref-Libet_2003_23-0" class="reference">
[23]</sup><sup id="cite_ref-RKane1_24-0" class="reference">
[24]</sup> compatibilist theories have been developed based on a form of identity dualism in which "the experience of conscious free will is the first-person perspective of the neural correlates of choosing".<sup id="cite_ref-Baumeister2_7-3" class="reference">
[7]</sup> It is however apparent that, even disregarding the hard problem of consciousness, "
consciousness plays a far smaller role in human life than Western culture has tended to believe."<sup id="cite_ref-illusion_25-0" class="reference">
[25]</sup>
Free will here is predominately treated with respect to
physical determinism in the strict sense of
nomological determinism, although other forms of determinism are also relevant to free will.<sup id="cite_ref-stanfordincompatibilismarguments_26-0" class="reference">
[26]</sup> For example, logical and
theological determinism challenge metaphysical libertarianism with ideas of
destiny and
fate, and
biological,
cultural and
psychological determinism feed the development of compatibilist models. Separate classes of
compatibilism and
incompatibilism may even be formed to represent these.<sup id="cite_ref-stanfordforeknowledge_27-0" class="reference">
[27]</sup>
<sup id="cite_ref-stanfordforeknowledge_27-0" class="reference">
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will#cite_note-stanfordforeknowledge-27</sup>
<sup id="cite_ref-stanfordforeknowledge_27-0" class="reference">
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will#In_Western_philosophy
</sup>