Objections To the Supralapsarian

[Dave...]

Dabney's: "Objections To the Supralapsarian"

Objections To the Supralapsarian.

But we object more particularly to the Supralapsarian scheme.

(a) That it is erroneous in representing God as having before His mind, as the objects of predestination, men conceived in posse only; and in making creation a means of their salvation or damnation. Whereas, an object must be conceived as existing, in order to have its destiny given to it. And creation can with no propriety be called a means for effectuating a decree of predestination as to creatures. It is rather a prerequisite of such decree.

(b.) It contradicts Scripture, which teaches us that God chose His elect "out of the world," John 15:19, and out of the "same lump" with the vessels of dishonor (Rom. 9:21). They were then regarded as being, along with the non–elect, in the common state of sin and misery.

(c.) Our election is in Christ our Redeemer (Eph. 1:4; 3:11), which clearly shows that we are conceived as being fallen, and in need of a Redeemer, in this act. And, moreover, our election is an election to the exercise of saving graces to be wrought in us by Christ (1 Pet. 1:2; 2 Thess. 2:13). (d.) Election is declared to be an act of mercy (Rom. 9:15 16, 11:5, 6), and preterition is an act of justice (Rom. 9:22). Now as mercy and goodness imply an apprehension of guilt and misery in their object, so justice implies ill-desert. This shows that man is predestined as fallen; and is not permitted to fall because predestined. I will conclude this part, by repeating the language of Turrettin, Loc. 4, Qu. 18, 5.

1. "By this hypothesis, the first act of God’s will towards some of His creatures is conceived to be an act of hatred, in so far as He willed to demonstrate His righteousness in their damnation, and indeed before they were considered as in sin, and consequently before they were deserving of hatred; nay, while they were conceived as still innocent, and so rather the objects of love. This does not seem compatible with God’s ineffable goodness.

2. "It is likewise harsh that, according to this scheme, God is supposed to have imparted to them far the greatest effects of love, out of a principle of hatred, in that He determines to create them in a state of integrity to this end, that He may illustrate His righteousness in their damnation. This seems to express Him neither as supremely good nor as supremely wise and just.

3. "It is erroneously supposed that God exercised an act of mercy and justice towards His creatures in His foreordination of their salvation and destruction, in that they are conceived as neither wretched, nor even existing as yet. But since those virtues (mercy and justice) are relative, they pre-suppose their object, do not make it.

4. "It is also asserted without warrant, that creation and the fall are means of election and reprobation, since they are antecedent to them: else sin would be on account of damnation, whereas damnation is on account of sin; and God would be said to have created men that He might destroy them."

Chapter 18: Predestination

What say you?

 

[electedbyHim]

Dabney's: "Objections To the Supralapsarian"

Objections To the Supralapsarian.

But we object more particularly to the Supralapsarian scheme.

(a) That it is erroneous in representing God as having before His mind, as the objects of predestination, men conceived in posse only; and in making creation a means of their salvation or damnation. Whereas, an object must be conceived as existing, in order to have its destiny given to it. And creation can with no propriety be called a means for effectuating a decree of predestination as to creatures. It is rather a prerequisite of such decree.

(b.) It contradicts Scripture, which teaches us that God chose His elect "out of the world," John 15:19, and out of the "same lump" with the vessels of dishonor (Rom. 9:21). They were then regarded as being, along with the non–elect, in the common state of sin and misery.

(c.) Our election is in Christ our Redeemer (Eph. 1:4; 3:11), which clearly shows that we are conceived as being fallen, and in need of a Redeemer, in this act. And, moreover, our election is an election to the exercise of saving graces to be wrought in us by Christ (1 Pet. 1:2; 2 Thess. 2:13). (d.) Election is declared to be an act of mercy (Rom. 9:15 16, 11:5, 6), and preterition is an act of justice (Rom. 9:22). Now as mercy and goodness imply an apprehension of guilt and misery in their object, so justice implies ill-desert. This shows that man is predestined as fallen; and is not permitted to fall because predestined. I will conclude this part, by repeating the language of Turrettin, Loc. 4, Qu. 18, 5.

1. "By this hypothesis, the first act of God’s will towards some of His creatures is conceived to be an act of hatred, in so far as He willed to demonstrate His righteousness in their damnation, and indeed before they were considered as in sin, and consequently before they were deserving of hatred; nay, while they were conceived as still innocent, and so rather the objects of love. This does not seem compatible with God’s ineffable goodness.

2. "It is likewise harsh that, according to this scheme, God is supposed to have imparted to them far the greatest effects of love, out of a principle of hatred, in that He determines to create them in a state of integrity to this end, that He may illustrate His righteousness in their damnation. This seems to express Him neither as supremely good nor as supremely wise and just.

3. "It is erroneously supposed that God exercised an act of mercy and justice towards His creatures in His foreordination of their salvation and destruction, in that they are conceived as neither wretched, nor even existing as yet. But since those virtues (mercy and justice) are relative, they pre-suppose their object, do not make it.

4. "It is also asserted without warrant, that creation and the fall are means of election and reprobation, since they are antecedent to them: else sin would be on account of damnation, whereas damnation is on account of sin; and God would be said to have created men that He might destroy them."

Chapter 18: Predestination

What say you?

I have Dabneys Systematic Theology.

In the past I have dabbled in Supralapsarianism and Infralapsarianism.

I have yet to do the deep dive into these teachings.

 

[electedbyHim]

Supralapsarianism.

The view that the decrees of God occurred (logically) in the following order: (1) to save some humans and condemn others; (2) to create both the elect and the reprobate; (3) to permit the fall of all humans; (4) to provide salvation only for the elect.

Infralapsarianism.

A form of Calvinism that teaches that the decree of the fall logically preceded that of election. The order of God’s decrees, then, is (1) to create human beings; (2) to permit the fall; (3) to save some and condemn others; and (4) to provide salvation only for the elect.


Biblical Doctrine: A Systematic Summary of Bible Truth (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2017), 938.

 

[electedbyHim]

In Reformed theology, the two main views of the order of the decrees are supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism. The proposed orders are:

SUPRALAPSARIAN
1. To elect some creatable people for divine blessing.
2. To create.
3. To permit the Fall.
4. To send Christ to provide atonement.
5. To send the Spirit to apply the atonement to the hearts of believers.
6. To glorify the elect.

INFRALAPSARIAN
1. To create.
2. To permit the Fall.
3. To elect some people for divine blessing.
4. Same as supra.
5. Same as supra.
6. Same as supra.

The controversy about the order of the decrees focuses on the order of the first three decrees, and on the odd supralapsarian notion of a decree to elect “creatable” people.

For defenders of the supralapsarian view, the important point is that God’s foremost concern in his decrees is to display his grace in a chosen people. Everything else is, roughly speaking, a means to that end. In order to give grace to those people, he must create them, permit the Fall, and redeem them. So decree 1 is related to the others as end to means. But decrees 2 and 3 are probably best construed as each providing the conditions necessary for the decrees after it to be accomplished. So there is no consistent pattern of order through the list. Perhaps the reason for giving priority to decree 1 over the others is that, for supralapsarians, God’s care for the elect is so much more profound than his concern for the rest of creation that the other decrees are of far lesser importance.

The infralapsarian view makes no judgment as to God’s foremost concern. It simply asks us to imagine the process as if God were thinking of the order in which events would occur. Here the governing principle is mostly what I have called condition-realization. It is therefore important to understand that the two lists have different concepts of order.22

For infralapsarians, the important point to remember is that God elects people out of the race of fallen people and conceives of them as fallen even in his planning before the Creation. The supralapsarians reply that to conceive of election this way is to make it less important in God’s mind than it should be; it makes election somehow subordinate to the Creation and the Fall.

I believe that we should not take any position on the debate between infralapsarians and supralapsarians. In urging such agnosticism, I am standing with Herman Bavinck,23 though my reasons are somewhat different from his:
1. The two positions equivocate on the meaning of order and therefore can’t be precisely compared with one another.

2. Scripture never explicitly presents a complete and definitive order of thoughts in God’s mind, in any of the relevant senses of order.

3. On the contrary, Scripture warns us against trying to read God’s mind. His thoughts are not our thoughts (Isa. 55:8). This discussion runs great risks of engaging in speculation into matters God has kept secret. For example, to cite a principle commonly urged in the literature, do we really know that in God’s decrees “the last in execution is the first in intent?”24 But it is not necessarily true of a symphony that the most important chords are the last ones. Nor is the last scene of a novel necessarily the most important. Is the final judgment more important than Jesus’ atonement? Surely, in these areas it is dangerous to presume that we can make value judgments. Why do we think we know so much about God’s mind?

4. Surely, in one sense, all of God’s decrees presuppose each other and exist for the sake of each other (see our discussion of “Creaturely Otherness” in chap. 8). God formulates each decree with all the others in view. Each influences the others. This fact makes it very difficult to list decrees according to any of the proposed principles of order.

5. In God’s mind, where the decrees take all others into account, all may be considered ends, and all may be considered means. They are all ends, because they all represent things God intends to do. And they are all means, because each decree supports the accomplishment of the others.

6. There are therefore reciprocal relationships among the purposes of God. He works miracles to attest prophecy, but he also ordains prophets to attest his mighty works. Creation provides the backdrop for redemption, but redemption restores creation. Redemption presupposes creation, but creation itself is in the image of redemption (see chap. 15).

7. I know of nothing in Scripture that settles the question whether God in eternity views the elect as “creatable” or as “created.” Most likely, he views the elect both ways. He views us as creatable, because before creation we haven’t been created yet, and because he might have chosen not to create us. Since our creation, viewed from eternity past, is only possible, not actual, God thinks of us as creatable. But he also views us as created, because he has in fact eternally decreed to create us, and because only after the decree of creation is accomplished can anything else happen to us. God views us in all states, actual and possible.

8. The question whether God envisions his elect as taken from a fallen humanity, or somehow existing apart from the Fall, does not make much sense. Certainly God foreordains that his elect will be redeemed from Adam’s fallen race, and I can’t imagine that supralapsarians would actually deny this.25 And, equally certainly, God knows what they would be like, absent the effects of the Fall. So we should not imagine either that God thinks about the elect while somehow putting the Fall out of his mind, or that he does not have a purpose for his elect that transcends the particular pattern of history that he brings to pass. Infralapsarians are particularly concerned to avoid the first option, and supralapsarians the second. But these two concerns are not inconsistent with one another, and they should not have led to the creation of two parties in the Reformed churches.

9. Although decrees 4–6 suggest a relatively equal standing for all divine decrees, I do not deny that God has priorities. His own glory, of course, has the highest priority. The eternal blessing of the elect in Christ is certainly an important means to that goal, and may itself be described as the goal of history. I argued in chapter 9 that the final state will be so great as to eliminate all sadness over evil. Earlier in this chapter, I argued that the goal of historical election is to manifest eternal election. So all of God’s decrees are ends, but some ends are higher than others. We should honor the truth stated somewhat inchoately by the supralapsarians, namely, that the glorification of the elect in Christ, the fulfillment of the kingdom of God, is the goal of history.

10. When one tries to see the practical relevance of all of this, it seems to boil down to a question of the meaning of the Fall or, more generally, the problem of evil. The supralapsarian position is in danger of making moral evil seem tame, as a mere step upward toward the glorification of the elect. Infralapsarians better understand the horrible, inexplicable character of evil, but they find it more difficult to understand evil as part of a harmonious divine plan.26

11. Supralapsarians focus on the lordship attribute of control, emphasizing that even the Fall has an intelligible role to play in God’s eternal plan. Infralapsarians focus more on the lordship attribute of authority, as if to say that we should not demand of God a rationale for evil, but should simply take him at his word that he is dealing with it in his own way. Both of these responses are biblical, as we saw in chapter 9. Perhaps our present need is not to debate these positions as if they were alternatives, but to ask God to cure the discomforts that create such questions—to deal with our hearts, as the Lord who is present in blessing and judgment.



22 For a somewhat more elaborate account of this issue, see DKG, 264, in the context of the chapter.

23 DG, 382–94.

24 I take it that “first in intent” here means “of first importance,” “of highest priority.”

25 Perhaps supralapsarians fear that this understanding makes predestination dependent on God’s foresight of the Fall. But recall my argument in chapter 8 that God’s foreordination should not be completely separated from his knowledge, as if he foreordained things in ignorance. Furthermore, both positions correlate predestination with God’s foresight in certain ways. The supralapsarians see God as decreeing creatable people, conceived as unfallen. But that is also a kind of foresight.

26 Thanks to Vern Poythress for suggesting to me this observation and the next.

John M. Frame, The Doctrine of God, A Theology of Lordship (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2002), 336–341.

 

[Dave...]

2. Scripture never explicitly presents a complete and definitive order of thoughts in God’s mind, in any of the relevant senses of order.

This is why, if I had to chose one, it would be infra. Quite frankly, Dabney's diagnosis that we 'should not be asking these questions' is probably the best answer I've seen yet. If you look at the OP with this in mind, I think Dabney made an effort not to go beyond scripture. His view, in my opinion, is the most biblical. I haven't gone deep into this either. After Dabney, I felt comfortable with leaving it there. I just thought that it may be worth posting.

Dave