[__ Science __ ] Study: Only 37% of American Pastors Have a Biblical Worldview

[Paul E. Michael]

No, you can't.​

I can't what?​

For example, you were unable to distinguish between the fact of a dog, and the observation of it.​

To what (if anything) are you referring by your phrase, "the fact of a dog"? To a dog?

Barbarian, by your phrase, "the fact of a dog," are you referring to a dog? Yes or No?
Barbarian, if by your phrase, "the fact of a dog," you are referring to a dog, then why are you doing so? Why would you not, rather, like a rationally-thinking person, just use the phrase, "a dog"—without adding to it your words, "the fact of"—to refer to a dog? No rationally-thinking person ever calls a dog, "the fact of a dog".

Lots of facts are about dogs, but, contrary to the stupidity you've been trying to hand us, no fact IS a dog/no dog IS a fact.
​

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Barbarian seems to think his observation of a dog IS a dog; Barbarian seems unable to distinguish between a dog and his observation of it.
Barbarian seems to think his observation of his mechanical watch IS his mechanical watch; Barbarian seems unable to distinguish between his mechanical watch and his observation of it.

Sorry, Barbarian, but your observation of a dog is NOT a dog; your observation of your mechanical watch is NOT your mechanical watch; your eating of a muffin is NOT a muffin.
​

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Evidence always, without exception, indicates (entails) propositions that are true, and never indicates (entails) propositions that are false; so one is always justified in believing what evidence indicates.​

As you saw, that's wrong.​

As a matter of fact, since it is not wrong, I did not see that it is wrong. Duh. I've seen you merely assert that it is wrong, as you're doing here. What "evidence" do you have for your assertion of the falsehood that evidence sometimes entails propositions that are false? So far, as you're wont to do, you've made lots of noise, but you're never going to back up your assertion by making noise—even if you like to call your noise, "evidence". So far, you've provided no evidence.

Here's a proposition that is false: "The earth is not round."

Now, Barbarian, please give us a proposition which you would say both 1) is true, and 2) entails that the earth is not round.​

 

[Paul E. Michael]

Being justified in believing something (because the evidence you have so indicates that) is not the same thing as being right. You know this. Why even bother to argue otherwise?

Since you assert that being justified in believing the proposition, P, is not being right in believing the proposition, P, please tell us, Barbarian, what difference you would say there is between being justified in believing the proposition, P, and being right in believing the proposition, P.

 

[Barbarian]

Since you assert that being justified in believing the proposition, P, is not being right in believing the proposition,

Not necessarily. As you just learned, evidence can point to one thing, even if more complete evidence indicates something else. But one is justified in following the evidence to make conclusions.

Shouldn't be necessary for anyone to explain that to you.

 

[Barbarian]

Here's a proposition that is false: "The earth is not round."

Now, Barbarian, please give us a proposition which you would say both 1) is true, and 2) entails that the earth is not round.

Let's see... you misrepresented what I said, and now you're demanding that I support your misrepresentation.

Nice try. Do you think no one notices it?

 

[Barbarian]

BTW, when do you think the evidence available to humans indicated that the Earth was not round? That might be your problem here. Tell us what you think.

 

[Paul E. Michael]

Those honest creationists haven't changed their minds

I don't think you're lying when you misrepresent what I said.

So, then, you agree that I'm honest in saying things in which, according to you, I "misrepresent" what you say?

Why, whenever you bring up your Darwinism-shilling buddies that you like to call "creationists," do you feel a need to modify that word with the adjective, "honest"?

I think you're lying in every, single post you've written in this thread (at least) in reply to my posts.

 

[Paul E. Michael]

BTW, when do you think the evidence available to humans indicated that the Earth was not round? That might be your problem here. Tell us what you think.

No evidence has ever indicated that the earth is not round. Duh.

What part of "No evidence indicates (entails) one or more proposition(s) that is/are false" do you not understand?

Every proposition that is false is a proposition not indicated (entailed) by evidence.​

The proposition, 'The earth is not round,' is a proposition that is false.​

Ergo, the proposition, 'The earth is not round,' is a proposition not indicated (entailed) by evidence.​

​

 

[Paul E. Michael]

Let's see... you misrepresented what I said, and now you're demanding that I support your misrepresentation.

Nice try. Do you think no one notices it?

IOW, of no proposition, whatsoever, would you be willing to say both 1) that it is true, and 2) that it entails the false proposition that the earth is not round.

As you've learned, no proposition that is true entails one or more proposition(s) that is/are false.

I asked you: What (if any) difference would you say there is between being justified in believing the proposition, P, and being right in believing the proposition, P?

You: <NO ANSWER>

See, as you and I both know well, to be justified in believing the proposition, P, is one and the same as to be right in believing the proposition, P.

 

[Barbarian]

Let's see... you misrepresented what I said, and now you're demanding that I support your misrepresentation.
Nice try. Do you think no one notices it?

IOW, of no proposition, whatsoever, would you be willing to say both 1) that it is true, and 2) that it entails the false proposition that the earth is not round.

Sorry, trying it twice won't make it work better. And yes, everyone notices.

I asked you: What (if any) difference would you say there is between being justified in believing the proposition, P, and being right in believing the proposition, P?

You've confused this with the question of whether or not one is justified in considering evidence about something for which one does not have certainty. Or perhaps you know the difference and are hoping we don't. Doesn't matter, really.

Wittgenstein held that knowledge is radically different from certitude and that neither concept entails the other. It is thus possible to be in a state of knowledge without being certain and to be certain without having knowledge. For him, certainty is to be identified not with apprehension, or “seeing,” but with a kind of acting. A proposition is certain, in other words, when its truth (and the truth of many related propositions) is presupposed in the various social activities of a community.
...
Plato’s search for definitions and, thereby, forms is a search for knowledge. But how should knowledge in general be defined? In the Theaetetus Plato argues that, at a minimum, knowledge involves true belief. No one can know what is false. People may believe that they know something that is in fact false. But in that case they do not really know; they only think they know. Knowledge is more than simply true belief. Suppose that someone has a dream in April that there will be an earthquake in September and, on the basis of that dream, forms the belief that there will be an earthquake in September. Suppose also that in fact there is an earthquake in September. The person has a true belief about the earthquake but not knowledge of it. What the person lacks is a good reason to support that true belief. In a word, the person lacks justification. Using such arguments, Plato contends that knowledge is justified true belief.

epistemology - Knowledge and certainty

Philosophers have disagreed sharply about the complex relationship between the concepts of knowledge and certainty. Are they the same? If not, how do they differ? Is it possible for someone to know that p without being certain that p, or to be certain that p without knowing that p? Is it...

www.britannica.com

An ideal theory of scientific method would consist of instructions that could lead an investigator from ignorance to knowledge. Descartes and Bacon sometimes wrote as if they could offer so ideal a theory, but after the mid-20th century the orthodox view was that this is too much to ask for. Following Hans Reichenbach (1891–1953), philosophers often distinguished between the “context of discovery” and the “context of justification.” Once a hypothesis has been proposed, there are canons of logic that determine whether or not it should be accepted—that is, there are rules of method that hold in the context of justification.

philosophy of science - Discovery, justification, and falsification

An ideal theory of scientific method would consist of instructions that could lead an investigator from ignorance to knowledge. Descartes and Bacon sometimes wrote as if they could offer so ideal a theory, but after the mid-20th century the orthodox view was that this is too much to ask for...

www.britannica.com

I noticed you declined to answer my question as to when you thought that evidence available to people indicated that the Earth was not round. Everyone noticed that, too.

 

[Barbarian]

No evidence has ever indicated that the earth is not round. Duh.

Flat Earthers cite flat plains as evidence. The flatness of some land is plain enough.

Many cultures have looked at the evidence and concluded a flat Earth. But as soon as people started seafaring, it became clear that it was not flat.

 

[Barbarian]

So, then, you agree that I'm honest in saying things in which, according to you, I "misrepresent" what you say?

I'm going to assume you're merely confused about the meanings of words. I posted some things about epistemology and the difference between being right and being justified in one's conclusions. Maybe that would help you.

See, as you and I both know well, to be justified in believing the proposition, P, is one and the same as to be right in believing the proposition, P.

Suppose I believe that it will rain on Good Friday because it always rains on Good Friday, and it does rain on that day. I was right. But I was not justified in believing it, because the evidence does not show that it always rains on Good Friday.

Are you beginning to realize what's wrong with your assumption?

 

[Paul E. Michael]

Flat Earthers cite flat plains as evidence.

The truth that plains are flat does not entail the falsehood that the earth is not round, so no rationally-thinking person would ever call the truth that plains are flat, "evidence that the earth is not round." No rationally-thinking person would ever claim that evidence supports the falsehood that the earth is not round. Duh.

Many cultures have looked at the evidence and concluded a flat Earth.

People have asserted that the earth is flat/not round, but so what? No one has ever concluded that the earth is flat/not round. Since no evidence entails that the earth is flat/not round, no one concludes that the earth is flat/not round. No one concludes what is not entailed by evidence. Duh.

You asininely mistake asserting for concluding.

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Here, you are asking a question you had never yet asked me until your post #469:

I noticed you declined to answer my question as to when you thought that evidence available to people indicated that the Earth was not round.

Answer: I never thought that any evidence indicates/indicated that the earth is/was not round. Duh.

And I note that you are lying through your teeth in telling me that you had already asked me that question prior to your post #469, since you, on the contrary, had never yet asked me it until your post #469.

Here, in your earlier post, your post #465, you asked me a different question than that one:

BTW, when do you think the evidence available to humans indicated that the Earth was not round?

In my post #467, I already answered the question you had asked me in your post #465, and here is the answer I gave you:

No evidence has ever indicated that the earth is not round. Duh.

"When?" you asked. "Never," I answered. No evidence has ever indicated that the earth is not round; never has any evidence indicated that the earth is not round. Duh.

If you want to say that I "declined to answer"—that I have not answered—this question that you had asked me in your post #465, then, in so saying, you will once again be lying through your teeth to and about me.

 

[Paul E. Michael]

Suppose I believe that it will rain on Good Friday because it always rains on Good Friday, and it does rain on that day. I was right. But I was not justified in believing it, because the evidence does not show that it always rains on Good Friday.

It doesn't always rain on Good Friday, so, in writing "it always rains on Good Friday," you are expressing a falsehood.
Since falsehood never entails truth, the falsehood, "it always rains on Good Friday," does not entail the truth, "it will rain on Good Friday," so you have not concluded, you have not deduced, you have not inferred the truth that "it will rain on Good Friday" from the falsehood that "it always rains on Good Friday." And, what are we supposed to make of your saying, "I believe....because," here, seeing as how the falsehood did not cause you to believe the truth?

• No false proposition entails one or more true proposition(s).
• No true proposition entails one or more false proposition(s).

You were justified/right in believing that "it will rain on Good Friday," because it is true that "it will rain on Good Friday."

 

[Barbarian]

Suppose I believe that it will rain on Good Friday because it always rains on Good Friday, and it does rain on that day. I was right. But I was not justified in believing it, because the evidence does not show that it always rains on Good Friday.

It doesn't always rain on Good Friday

Pleased that you agree with me.

so, in writing "it always rains on Good Friday," you are expressing a falsehood.

You've missed the assertion. The speaker was right; it did rain on Good Friday. But he wasn't justified in believing so, because the evidence (as you mentioned) does not support it.

And as you now see, it's possible for one to be right, but not be justified in thinking one is right. It's also possible to be wrong, and to be justified in thinking one is right. Would you like to see an example, again? Let's try another one for you. A man consults the tide tables for a certain coastline and predicts a neap tide (very low tide) for a certain day because the moon will be positioned where it always causes low tides. Is he justified in this prediction? Let me know what you think.

You were justified/right in believing that "it will rain on Good Friday," because it is true that "it will rain on Good Friday."

No. Since all he had was his mistaken idea that it always rains on Good Friday, he was not justified in thinking so, (the evidence does not support his conclusion) but he was right, because it actually did rain on Good Friday.

Think about it for a bit. The link on epistemology I left you discusses this. Some philosophers see justification and being right as entirely different kinds of things. And they have pretty good arguments for that, although others dispute the idea.

It's not as simple as you imagine it is.

 

[stovebolts]

You asininely mistake asserting for concluding.

And I note that you are lying through your teeth in telling me that you had already asked me that question

I could go on…. But these types of abrasive posts are the types of posts that get members banned from threads.

You are now permanently removed from this thread.

Please visit our community message and TOS. Most of all, be respectful of others.

 

[Barbarian]

Hey, am I the only one who sees my avatar on Paul Michell's posts? I guess imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.