Can We Experience Relationship With God in a Non-Open World

[JM]

…[W]ith libertarian free will many prayers make no sense. . . .

…[C]onsider petitions about ourselves that do involve our free will. Suppose we ask the Lord to help us be more faithful in Bible reading, prayer, and witnessing. Or suppose we pray that the Lord will help us treat our family or neighbor better. I maintain that if libertarian free will obtains in our world, these are to a large degree absurd requests. For what are we asking God to do? In order for me to be more faithful in Bible reading, prayer, and witnessing, won’t I have to decide to do these things? But if I have libertarian free will and am allowed to exercise it, how can God fulfill my request? If he doesn’t override my libertarian freedom, he cannot guarantee the fulfillment of my request. So what am I asking him to do? Override my freedom? Make it the case that I freely decide to do these things? But here libertarians tell us that, if God brings it about that we do anything, we don’t do it freely. It seems that God cannot be certain to grant my request unless he overrides my freedom, but why would God want me to engage in these spiritual exercises because I’m forced to do so (according to my libertarian free will, I would be forced, but God wants my love and devotion freely!)? Shouldn’t I, then, petition myself in an attempt to convince myself to do these things? After all, only I can freely effect what I choose to do, given libertarian free will. But if I did petition myself, wouldn’t that usually mean I had already decided to do these things, and if so, the petition becomes unnecessary? I submit, then, that unless I really want God to override my freedom, what I ask him in these cases is absurd. If he doesn’t tamper with my libertarian free will, he can’t do what I ask; only I can, but petitioning myself engages me in the further absurdities mentioned. John Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God, Foundations of Evangelical Theology, pp. 705-706.


Quote:
1. Do you believe that the Holy Spirit plays any role in the sinner coming to faith in Christ? (Because the Bible affirms this, all true evangelicals will answer 'yes')

2. Do you believe that, apart from any supernatural work of the Holy Spirit, the sinner, by nature, has the will, ability, affection and desire to come to Christ?
(Because the Bible denies this all true evangelicals will answer 'no')

Thus you have, in two simple questions, completely disarmed any and all argument against the free will of man. Here is plain proof that all Christians, without exception, believe that no man is found NATURALLY willing to submit to the humbling terms of the gospel of Christ. The natural man, apart from the Holy Spirit, has no desire and affection for Christ and thus no free will to believe the gospel or do any redemptive good, because, of necessity, due to a corruption of his/her nature, fallen man is in bondage to sin. If the Holy Spirit is necessary to make us love God, then it follows that we had no ability to love him before the arrival of the Holy Spirit. It also means that the Holy Spirit is not given because we chose to love God. We chose to love God because the Spirit is given. Grace, not a virtue in man, takes the initiative. When we say a person is in bondage it simply means they have no freedom to choose otherwise, left to themselves. Through the centuries, Augustine (Anti-Pelagian Writings), Luther (Bondage of the Will), Calvin (Bondage and Liberation of the Will), Edwards (Freedom of the Will), etc... discussed the free will controversy in terms of sin (bondage) and holiness (freedom). And why did these Reformers all discuss the issue this way? Because this is how the Bible defines bondage and freedom. Using a word picture, when God redeems Israel from Egypt the idea is in their deliverance from bondage to slavery which God had accomplished for His people in the exodus (Exod 6:6). Christ now likewise redeems his people, the true Passover Lamb sacrificed for us so that God, seeing the blood on our doorpost, so to speak, passes over our sins, But now, instead of being delivered from physical slavery in Egypt Christ sets us free from the bondage of our wills to sin, enabling us to believe. He died for the reign of sin that once mastered us. So when Reformed Christians now and through history discuss whether or not we have a free will, they are usually pointing to the fact that man's will and affections are broken and, due to fallen nature, "will not come into the light" (John 3:20). The libertarian, on the other hand, asserts that we have the innate ability to choose otherwise, that is, contrary to who we are by nature. But Augustine, finding more support in the Bible, asserted that prior to the Fall, (1) man was able to sin or not sin. (2) But after the Fall, unregenerate man is not able not to sin. (3) Fallen, but regenerated man is able to sin or not sin, and (4) Glorified man is not able to sin. Is the Will Free by Nature or by Grace?
by John Hendryx

A quote from http://www.calvinistgadfly.com on June 19, 2006 titled, "Is Arminian theology irrational?"

We are quickly getting into the heart of the matter. Arminian theology asserts that if we could not have chosen to do something otherwise, then there is no free will. Here is their irrational fallacy in a nutshell. They are resisting any idea of a guaranteed result from any same conditions. It is irrational because there is no explanation for the effect of an action.

If they cry, “oh yes, there can be an explanation,†then I ask, “Will it always be guaranteed to produce the same action?†They of course being the libertarian have to say “no.â€Â

This is ironic because Calvinists are frequently accused of having no basis for personal responsibility. It is the Arminian who has no basis for personal responsibility because there are no conditions that can exist in their system that can produce the desired result every time.

For personal responsibility to exist there must be the same set of conditions to always bring about the exact same result. How else can you hold someone responsible if they can claim no reason (i.e. set of antecedent conditions) for their actions?

So rationality is bound up with explanatory power, which is, in turn, bound up with causality.

If certain necessary and sufficient conditions are met, a certain outcome is inevitableâ€â€like a chemical reaction. That is how we explicate the outcome.

Now, in Arminian theology, freedom is contracausal. I am free if I am able to do otherwise given the very same antecedent conditions. I can love my mother one day and hate her the next with the same antecedent conditions. Again, Arminianism has no basis to hold individuals accountable.

 

[Drew]

…[W]ith libertarian free will many prayers make no sense. . . .

…[C]onsider petitions about ourselves that do involve our free will. Suppose we ask the Lord to help us be more faithful in Bible reading, prayer, and witnessing. Or suppose we pray that the Lord will help us treat our family or neighbor better. I maintain that if libertarian free will obtains in our world, these are to a large degree absurd requests. For what are we asking God to do? In order for me to be more faithful in Bible reading, prayer, and witnessing, won’t I have to decide to do these things? But if I have libertarian free will and am allowed to exercise it, how can God fulfill my request? If he doesn’t override my libertarian freedom, he cannot guarantee the fulfillment of my request. So what am I asking him to do? Override my freedom? Make it the case that I freely decide to do these things? But here libertarians tell us that, if God brings it about that we do anything, we don’t do it freely. It seems that God cannot be certain to grant my request unless he overrides my freedom, but why would God want me to engage in these spiritual exercises because I’m forced to do so (according to my libertarian free will, I would be forced, but God wants my love and devotion freely!)? Shouldn’t I, then, petition myself in an attempt to convince myself to do these things? After all, only I can freely effect what I choose to do, given libertarian free will. But if I did petition myself, wouldn’t that usually mean I had already decided to do these things, and if so, the petition becomes unnecessary? I submit, then, that unless I really want God to override my freedom, what I ask him in these cases is absurd. If he doesn’t tamper with my libertarian free will, he can’t do what I ask; only I can, but petitioning myself engages me in the further absurdities mentioned.

This is actually a pretty decent argument but I can immediately think of one counterargument. The above argument implicitly overlooks the possibility that God can manipulate the environment external to me in order to fulfill the kinds of prayer requests that are addressed in the above quote.

Let's say that I pray to be more faithful in Bible reading. God can arrange it so that I encounter all kinds of stimuli which would give me all kinds of motivations to read my Bible, with the ultimate decision to read (or not) still left up to me. He may, for example. cause it to be the case that I meet all sorts of people who have positive stories to tell about reading the Bible has influenced them positively. These could motivate me, under God's "influence" but still freely, to read my Bible more often.

I can anticipate the following objection to what I have said: "Yes, but in order to arrange the external world in this manner, God would need to either manipulate other people's free will, or those other free will agents could easilly torpedo God's plan to meet my prayer request. This is a legitimate question. However, I will say two things. First, I have never claimed that there are that many things that we actually have free will about - and in fact, I believe the scope of things that we are free in respect to is really quite small. Second, I would argue that the world is so complex and there are so many things that are indeed under God's control, He can effectively guarantee that he can arrange for the "influences" that make up his answer to prayer.

What if I am on a desert island with nothing on it at all except my Bible. If I have free will about reading my Bible and pray that God will help me be more diligent in reading, how can my prayer be answered, since there are no "external" circumstances for God to manipulate in order to influence me? Fair question.

My answer would be that God can indeed sovereignly "inject" thoughts into my mind without really compromising my free will. He can "inject" thoughts and "suggestions". Does this compromise my free will? I do not think so. We all can relate to being overwhelmed with thoughts of desire for something (e.g. food). I think it is entirely reasonable to say that we still have free will choice whether to act on those desires and eat.

 

[JM]

my free will

 

[Imagican]

God IS able to manipulate His creation in ANY way that He sees fit. There ARE some circumstances in which our 'free will' IS sacrificed for His purpose. One example is the 'hardening of Pharoh's heart. Phaoroh had actually decided to 'let the people go' an number of times and the Bible plainly states that GOD hardended his heart for HIS purpose.

I only offer this to show that much of these arguments are being aproached from a 'static' position that each is offering as a MUST. God is NOT static and His will may be altered according to circumstance.

Another example besides Moses is Abraham when asking God if he would destroy fifty righteous along with the wicked. God's original intention was to destroy the cities REGARDLESS of circumstance. Abraham however, convinced God that there could be an alternative. We would NOT have this example if it were not possible for God to 'change His mind. He cannot LIE, but He can certainly choose to alter what He will at His Will.

I can see logic in both sides of this discussion. However, I believe that the answer lies somewhere in between the two views. We DO have freedom of choice; to an extent. So there is an amount of Liberalism to be experienced through Christ. And there IS an amount of effort that we MUST make in our acceptance of the guidance of the Spirit. We are UNABLE to abide in the law. But, we are certainly able to allow the Spirit to guide us towards an observance of the Will of The Father.

It's really not as cut and dry as some would assume. God loves us AS our Father. His rules are NOT static in that we will bring about abandonment by breaking them. He is CERTAINLY not pleased when we choose to disobey, but He IS there to offer His love and forgiveness regardless. All He ask in return is acknowledgement of His Love and an offering of our love in return. The more we are willing to 'follow this recipe' the closer we get and the less we will disobey 'THROUGH OUR LOVE FOR HIM', not as an obligation.

 

[Drew]

Thus you have, in two simple questions, completely disarmed any and all argument against the free will of man. Here is plain proof that all Christians, without exception, believe that no man is found NATURALLY willing to submit to the humbling terms of the gospel of Christ. The natural man, apart from the Holy Spirit, has no desire and affection for Christ and thus no free will to believe the gospel or do any redemptive good, because, of necessity, due to a corruption of his/her nature, fallen man is in bondage to sin. If the Holy Spirit is necessary to make us love God, then it follows that we had no ability to love him before the arrival of the Holy Spirit. It also means that the Holy Spirit is not given because we chose to love God. We chose to love God because the Spirit is given. Grace, not a virtue in man, takes the initiative. When we say a person is in bondage it simply means they have no freedom to choose otherwise, left to themselves. Through the centuries, Augustine (Anti-Pelagian Writings), Luther (Bondage of the Will), Calvin (Bondage and Liberation of the Will), Edwards (Freedom of the Will), etc... discussed the free will controversy in terms of sin (bondage) and holiness (freedom). And why did these Reformers all discuss the issue this way? Because this is how the Bible defines bondage and freedom. Using a word picture, when God redeems Israel from Egypt the idea is in their deliverance from bondage to slavery which God had accomplished for His people in the exodus (Exod 6:6). Christ now likewise redeems his people, the true Passover Lamb sacrificed for us so that God, seeing the blood on our doorpost, so to speak, passes over our sins, But now, instead of being delivered from physical slavery in Egypt Christ sets us free from the bondage of our wills to sin, enabling us to believe. He died for the reign of sin that once mastered us. So when Reformed Christians now and through history discuss whether or not we have a free will, they are usually pointing to the fact that man's will and affections are broken and, due to fallen nature, "will not come into the light" (John 3:20). The libertarian, on the other hand, asserts that we have the innate ability to choose otherwise, that is, contrary to who we are by nature. But Augustine, finding more support in the Bible, asserted that prior to the Fall, (1) man was able to sin or not sin. (2) But after the Fall, unregenerate man is not able not to sin. (3) Fallen, but regenerated man is able to sin or not sin, and (4) Glorified man is not able to sin.[/color]

I am not sure whether this is what I believe or not. As I am sure the reader will know, one of the big challenges such a view gives rise to is the question of whether it can be just for someone to be condemned for a nature that they are born with - it runs counter to our sense of justice to punish someone who simply does not have the resources to control their behaviour.

And I am especially curious as to how this position is reconciled with other statements from JM's posts especially the statement about how we "freely choose to continue in (Adam's?) rebellion". This latter statement strikes me as being in clear contradiction with the statement "But after the Fall, unregenerate man is not able not to sin". Please explain how these work together as I think readers can appreciate how they seem to contradict. However, I am open-minded about things and am willing to consider an explanation that resolves the seeming contradiction.

 

[Novum]

By the way, I don't want to be seen as coming across harshly. But for a skeptic like myself, there is no belief without evidence.

The problem with this is that it presumes that the world is put together in such a manner that what I will call "third party objective evidence" is the only method to discern truth. The world is not put together that way. Forget about free will for the moment and consider your subjective world of private internal experiences - the taste of an orange, the scent of a rose, etc.

I never stated that it was the only method to discern truth. Dowsers honestly think they can determine the location of water by using a forked wooden rod. Some Christians think they learn truth by hearing the word of god spoken directly to them by god himself.

But objective, replicatable evidence is the only means of discerning truth that is accepted by modern science. And, to be quite frank with you, I think science is doing just fine with only that means. ;)

These experiences seem inarguably real (at least mine do to me). And yet they are forever beyond the grasp of "3rd party objective" characterization. While we can identify the neuronal activity associated with the taste of an orange, such a characterization does not really suffice to tell the story of why the orange tastes "this way" and not "that way". I submit that you and others are tacitly assuming that the only kind of reliable evidence is third party evidence - evidence that can be seen by all.

Yes, I am making that claim - at least insofar as science is concerned. Subjective experiences and revelations like those you claim do not have a place in modern science and should be restricted to the realm of philosophy.

Yet consciousness shows each of us (privately) a rich world of subjective experience that, by its very nature, cannot be "measured" in the sense that one cannot "make public" any characterization whatsoever of what , for example, an orange "tastes like".

Does it matter? Let's say, when you see a stop sign, its redness to you appears like green does to me. Maybe, when you see the green leaves on a tree, they appear red to me. It doesn't matter in the least what "red" or "green" look like to you as long as you know what I mean when I say "red" or "green". By definition, I can never know what color you really see when you see a stop sign, but as long as we both think it's red and our beliefs remain consistent, it will never matter.

It is important to let nature, not any a priori human commitment to the primacy of "objective" evidence, dictate the terms of what's real and whether nature lets us demonstrate that "pubically" is really nature's business to decide.

How do you propose that we allow nature to decide anything? How does nature decide things?

 

[Novum]

i said one who acknowledged the existence of god must neccesitate to believe what i enumerated if he has to make sense of his faith. i mean there is no sense in believing to a saviour who can not saved you in the end.

Is that so, hybrid? Don't you think we could very easily find at least one Christian - and maybe millions of them - who don't agree with at least one of your five statements? Who are you to make such broad generalizations for all christians all over the world?

[quote:b83cc]Didn't that already happen though, when Satan flipped God off and left to find a place of his own?

but what if your just living in a matrix? ;-)[/quote:b83cc]

Then I wonder what the real world looks like. ;)

 

[hybrid]

Is that so, hybrid? Don't you think we could very easily find at least one Christian - and maybe millions of them - who don't agree with at least one of your five statements? Who are you to make such broad generalizations for all christians all over the world?

i'm not sure what i posted that make you post with such a tone . what is your issue with my position that god will ultimately triumph in the end.? if you don't wanna believe it, then let alone those who wanted too.

i have never met a christian or anyone who believes in god that thinks satan or evil will be triumphant in the end. without fear of being contradicted i don't think any christian outhere would think otherwise. it's not about me, but the rightness of that (good over evil) belief.

but your a sceptic, what is it to you if one christian to another thinks god predestines or god gives total freewill,

Then I wonder what the real world looks like. ;)

me too. that is why a haven't found it yet necessary to remove the hypothesis of god in the overall schemes of things.

fer instance, you were discussing with ddrew quantum physics, i understand that your make up can be breakdown into atoms. why then atoms, which are non-livings things when compounded into a complex matter can become a living thing.

or a seed, which are just combination of chemicals, again non living substances but when touched by water can sprout into a living thing. where does the life comes from?

and what about the whys? why do we exist? can science answer such questions?




.

 

[Novum]

i'm not sure what i posted that make you post with such a tone . what is your issue with my position that god will ultimately triumph in the end.? if you don't wanna believe it, then let alone those who wanted too

It's not about my belief, of which I haven't posted any. I'm just making an observation.

i have never met a christian or anyone who believes in god that thinks satan or evil will be triumphant in the end. without fear of being contradicted i don't think any christian outhere would think otherwise. it's not about me, but the rightness of that (good over evil) belief.

Does that mean they don't exist, just because you haven't met one?

but your a sceptic, what is it to you if one christian to another thinks god predestines or god gives total freewill,

Frankly hybrid, it doesn't "matter" to me what you believe. But we're talking about philosophy, and that's why I'm interested in the discussion.

[quote:2d65d] Then I wonder what the real world looks like. ;)

me too. that is why a haven't found it yet necessary to remove the hypothesis of god in the overall schemes of things.[/quote:2d65d]

This appears to me a non-sequitur. Can you explain?

fer instance, you were discussing with ddrew quantum physics, i understand that your make up can be breakdown into atoms. why then atoms, which are non-livings things when compounded into a complex matter can become a living thing.

Not only my make-up. Yours too, along with the keyboard you're typing on and most everything else. ;)

or a seed, which are just combination of chemicals, again non living substances but when touched by water can sprout into a living thing. where does the life comes from?

Are seeds not alive? Who decides so? You?

and what about the whys? why do we exist? can science answer such questions?

No, science cannot answer these questions because they are not scientific questions. These questions are for philosophy.

 

[Drew]

But objective, replicatable evidence is the only means of discerning truth that is accepted by modern science. And, to be quite frank with you, I think science is doing just fine with only that means.

Well of course, this is what science is all about. No one is suggesting that science "expand" its scope to embrace the non-objective.

Yes, I am making that claim - at least insofar as science is concerned. Subjective experiences and revelations like those you claim do not have a place in modern science and should be restricted to the realm of philosophy.

I think we probably agree that subjective experiences are indeed "real" and we probably also agree that they are necessarily private - this is the hand of cards we have been dealt. I am not sure that I agree with what I think you may be implying here, however. For example, I think that there would be nothing unscientific about replacing, say, the standard model (leptons, quarks, gravity, weak nuclear force, etc) with an entirely new model, based on "intelligent entities" or "gods".

The reason we dropped the idea that the universe was run by "gods" was because it was not a very good model (and we found a much better one). But, and this is the key point, we did not drop it because it is a priori "unscientific". The universe could indeed have turned out to best characterized as being subject to the influence of "gods". And if these gods had reliable behaviours (e.g. if bad people always got zapped by lightning), perhaps our model would have been based on "gods" and "morality particles", not the standard model.

Of course, this is not how it has worked out. But I think the open-ness of things allows for the possibility of some future scientific characterization of the world that does indeed include, for example, "god-like" entities as a basic component of nature. We are not done yet in our attempts to create a model for reality.

 

[JM]

Drew,

It doesn’t matter what arguments are presented to you, you simply justify your position for your own libertarian freewill, the religion of natural man.

j

 

[Drew]

Hi JM:

I am doing nothing more than what you are doing - arguing for a position that I believe to be true. If the arguments presented are good, they will resist counterargument. If they are shown to be weak, then they are not good arguments to begin with. This is how we get at truth. You are not expecting me to accept the position you advocate just on your say-so, are you? If your position is strong, it should be demonstrable as such, by Biblical and maybe other arguments.

One of your most recent quotes (which I have yet to answer) appears to be a very good one - the one about the "contracausality" of the Arminian position. Let's say I come up with a counterargument. You and others are free to critique it. This is how we all learn. If I don't come with a good counterargument, your position is strengthened. So be it.

The whole approach of merely asserting that someone who does not agree with you is following the "religion of natural man" will be seen by the serious reader as begging the question. On what basis will the reader decide that my (Drew's) position is indeed that of "natural man" (with the strong implication of disconnection to God's truth)? Surely, not just because you claim this to be case?

 

[Drew]

We are quickly getting into the heart of the matter. Arminian theology asserts that if we could not have chosen to do something otherwise, then there is no free will. Here is their irrational fallacy in a nutshell. They are resisting any idea of a guaranteed result from any same conditions. It is irrational because there is no explanation for the effect of an action.

If they cry, “oh yes, there can be an explanation,†then I ask, “Will it always be guaranteed to produce the same action?†They of course being the libertarian have to say “no.â€Â

This is ironic because Calvinists are frequently accused of having no basis for personal responsibility. It is the Arminian who has no basis for personal responsibility because there are no conditions that can exist in their system that can produce the desired result every time.

For personal responsibility to exist there must be the same set of conditions to always bring about the exact same result. How else can you hold someone responsible if they can claim no reason (i.e. set of antecedent conditions) for their actions?

So rationality is bound up with explanatory power, which is, in turn, bound up with causality.

If certain necessary and sufficient conditions are met, a certain outcome is inevitableâ€â€like a chemical reaction. That is how we explicate the outcome.

Now, in Arminian theology, freedom is contracausal. I am free if I am able to do otherwise given the very same antecedent conditions. I can love my mother one day and hate her the next with the same antecedent conditions. Again, Arminianism has no basis to hold individuals accountable.

Of course, a believer in free will will agree that the same set of conditions will not always bring about the same result. This is one of the implications of holding that human beings have a degree of freedom of choice. As the author points out, "I can love my mother one day and hate her the next with the same antecedent conditions." What the author does not do is explain why this implies no basis to hold individuals accountable.

The author writes "For personal responsibility to exist there must be the same set of conditions to always bring about the exact same result." Why? Why is this the case? He then says "How else can you hold someone responsible if they can claim no reason (i.e. set of antecedent conditions) for their actions". This has been addressed before. It is highly dubious that, whatever such a person might claim, his actions factually have "no reason" - all actions have reasons and causes.

Let's cut to the chase here. If the same set of conditions lead to my decision to hate my mother on Monday and then love her on Tuesday, the fact remains that there is a factual truth about what God wants me do - he wants me to love my mother. So on Monday I sin freely in not loving my mother and on Tuesday I freely take the Christlike route and love my mother. I am accountable for my Monday sin for the precise reason that, as a free agent, I elect to do what I know to be wrong.

It is almost as if the author is arguing (e.g. by his analogy to the chemical reaction) that I am like a "machine" that must, of course, respond exactly the same way to the same set of inputs, otherwise I violate causality. Well of course, if I were a machine, that would indeed be the case. But the believer in free will asserts no such thing, and therefore can legitimately claim to be able to do 2 different things on consecutive days (in this example) even in the presence of the same circumstances.

I can understand why a critic of free will would ask: "If the circumstances are exactly the same, how is it at all possible to do different things on Monday and Tuesday? This question, I think, implicitly presumes a world that is causal in the "conventional" sense. But this is exactly what the proponent of free will believes is not true - he believes that the actions of human beings are not like those of a complicated computer.

Why I think such a view is tenable will hopefully be the subject of another post. The issues raised by the above quote from JM are numerous and I understand that a critic of the "free will" position will have a number of questions. I do not pretend to have responded fully to all the implied questions raised by the JM post. Its just that I do not think that the material succeeds in making a case that free will is inconsistent with moral responsibility.

I am not sure I have understood the material that JM posted. If someone wants to try to clarify it, please do so.

 

[Novum]

But objective, replicatable evidence is the only means of discerning truth that is accepted by modern science. And, to be quite frank with you, I think science is doing just fine with only that means.

Well of course, this is what science is all about. No one is suggesting that science "expand" its scope to embrace the non-objective.

Yes, I am making that claim - at least insofar as science is concerned. Subjective experiences and revelations like those you claim do not have a place in modern science and should be restricted to the realm of philosophy.

I think we probably agree that subjective experiences are indeed "real" and we probably also agree that they are necessarily private - this is the hand of cards we have been dealt. I am not sure that I agree with what I think you may be implying here, however. For example, I think that there would be nothing unscientific about replacing, say, the standard model (leptons, quarks, gravity, weak nuclear force, etc) with an entirely new model, based on "intelligent entities" or "gods".

I do not agree; what you're proposing is possibly the very definition of unscientific. There is no objective, duplicatable evidence in favor of gods or "intelligent entities". No experiment can possibly be run by mankind - even in theory - that would enable us to test whether or not such entities exist. On top of it all, belief in these gods is, by definition, an incredibly - if not exclusively - subjective experience. This alternate proposal of yours fails every test of validity for scientific evidence.

Again, proposals like yours do not belong in modern science. They can (and should), however, be discussed vigorously and frequently in philosophy.

The reason we dropped the idea that the universe was run by "gods" was because it was not a very good model (and we found a much better one). But, and this is the key point, we did not drop it because it is a priori "unscientific". The universe could indeed have turned out to best characterized as being subject to the influence of "gods". And if these gods had reliable behaviours (e.g. if bad people always got zapped by lightning), perhaps our model would have been based on "gods" and "morality particles", not the standard model.

Perhaps, but your proposed world is in a universe so unlike our own that I find it difficult to even begin to speculate. For example, you state that bad people would always get zapped by lightning. What kind of person is a "bad person" in your universe? Who decides who the bad people are? How many "bad people" need to not get zapped by lightning before we have to throw away that model?

Of course, this is not how it has worked out. But I think the open-ness of things allows for the possibility of some future scientific characterization of the world that does indeed include, for example, "god-like" entities as a basic component of nature. We are not done yet in our attempts to create a model for reality.

No, we are of course not yet done with our model - we may never be. But there is no valid scientific evidence for god or gods; there never has been. And, until there is such evidence, science will continue to work wonders without them.

On another note, you did not answer my questions about how we might allow nature to "decide" things for us. I'm admittely still rather curious what you meant. ;)

 

[Drew]

I do not agree; what you're proposing is possibly the very definition of unscientific. There is no objective, duplicatable evidence in favor of gods or "intelligent entities". No experiment can possibly be run by mankind - even in theory - that would enable us to test whether or not such entities exist. On top of it all, belief in these gods is, by definition, an incredibly - if not exclusively - subjective experience. This alternate proposal of yours fails every test of validity for scientific evidence.

Please tell me what specifically about the scientific method precludes the possibility that the scientific model of the world incorporate, for example, "entities" (I am speaking very very loosely) that embody shall we say (and only by way of example) "moral" properties. Our present model of the world is made of things that do not have any such properties - atoms do not behave in any manner that could be described as "moral".

But, and I cannot emphasize this enough, it could be the case that some world is put together in such a manner that the most useful model of the world (in the very scientific sense of predicting experimental results) would indeed be based on constructs (entities) that possess a moral character.

I think you are letting the way our world is presently modeled cloud the possibility of other models that are scientific and meet every criteria for a scientific model. It just so happens that our world (presently) does not seem to admit to such a modeling. But you have not provided any argument that shows how this admittedly unorthodox model of the world could not qualify as scientific. Please provide any criteria you wish and I believe I will be able to show how this unorthodox model could qualify as a scientific model - in the right kind of universe.

Let me try to illustrate by a very simple and admittedly crude example. Suppose that every time any person in the world took somebody's life, they were struck dead. No exceptions. I think we might be inclined to propose a model of the world wherein there is a "force" that strikes killers dead. True, this is not a model of the world that is expressed in terms of "low level" building blocks like atoms and gluons. But it makes verifiable predictions about the outcome of experiments. This strikes me as making it a scientific theory of the world.

What kind of person is a "bad person" in your universe? Who decides who the bad people are? How many "bad people" need to not get zapped by lightning before we have to throw away that model?

As to what makes a person bad, I never claimed that such a classification did not require precise objective criteria in order to be included in a scientific model. Just for the heck of it, I will define a bad person as one who, if put in a room with a puppy, will run over and kick it. Now please do not tell me that this could not be the case - it is just not the case in our world.

 

[Drew]

On another note, you did not answer my questions about how we might allow nature to "decide" things for us. I'm admittely still rather curious what you meant. ;)

My wording may have been a little imprecise - I merely meant that we have to examine the world and discern its nature. We cannot come to the world with the pre-conceived idea that only that which is demonstrable by objective evidence is "real". So, for example, in our world, "sense" experiences are not public - they simply do not travel between minds. And I trust you will agree that in some universe, we might all feel pain when someone gets whacked in the knee.

So just because sense experiences are not objectively "public", we should not simply declare that they lack reality and are somehow have a lesser ontological status than, say, atoms and quarks.

Having said all this, I realize that you have never claimed that private sense experiences were not real.

So I suspect that this is not an item of controversy between us.....

 

[lovely]

Drew, I stopped posting because a lot of others were posting. I thank you for your responses, and am not offended by any of them in the least. I prefer to be viewed as tripped up by the subtle things to those I disagree with. :wink:

I wouldn't say my post was intended to be an argument, but rather an instant response to the quoted part of your orginal post. The thing is my line of thought was streaming from what I know to be true teachings in Scripture. To hear otherwise makes me instantly think that if those things you spoke are true, then the Word is not, and if none of it is true so why bother? I am saying if God, and His attributes, as He defines them, are subject to change to accomodate His relationship with man, then He is not being true to His nature, and is putting forth a misrepresentation of Himself that contradicts His own Word. We are the ones who need to be changed. We are the ones who have been distorted by evil. If God's power is limited in His nature, then it goes against who He says He is in His Word, and this is a lie. Both of these opinions about God's power in the areas of knowing the future exhaustively, and His control of the world are based on what I beleive Scripture teaches.

The future is known by God, down to the forming of David in his mother's womb. He says that his days were already ordered from before his formation. This is David expounding on God's knowing the future exhaustively. All things work to good for those who love Him and are called according to His purpose. God is able to undistort good for those He has called. He uses this distortion, this evil, for His own purpose...but, He didn't do the distorting.

I can provide you with Scriptures that teach that God is All-knowing, All-seeing, and Ever-present, and Holy, and All-Mighty, and that He can do His all of His Holy Will. I can also show you where it says that everyone sins, and deserves to die of their sin. I can also show you where it teaches that we are slaves to sin, and that Christ is our redeemer and has paid the price for those God has given to Him as vessels of mercy. It also says that the Holy Spirit changes, regenerates, a heart through His witness of Christ as the Way. This is all found in Scripture. So that is why I responded to your statement the way I did. One of two things have to be true if you are correct. Either God is choosing to limit His power to have relationship with man, or He is limited in power in His nature. Both contradict His Word, and nullify the Gospel.

I am not sure if you believe Scripture, but I do know that we can not know, or understand, all of God's plans, thoughts, and actions in a full way in our flesh. How can we, as humans, obtain that sort of understanding in a fallen state? We are limited by our flesh, and the evil that has distored us, and all else that is good. We are in darkness, until we see God's light of illumination. Thy Word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my path. It is only when our spirit is given Life that we are able to walk in the spirit, and we are still unable to fully stop sinning. It is the death of this flesh that will be our ultimate freedom...body, and soul.

Our relationship with God, in our present state, is built solely on Christ's work on the cross, not on our free will. We have a will to sin, but it is not free...it is bound. If my will was totally free, then I can choose not to be bound by a Sin state, and to not sin at all. Then, I do not really need a relationship with God through the blood of Christ, or to have the wages of sin paid with His blood, or to have the gap bridged by the cross, and so on, because I will be able to relate to Him as Adam and Eve did prior to the fall in a state of perfection, and an ability to be in His presence in a holy way. I would not be the good that has been distorted, and I would not need a fixin'.

Because of Adam's choice, we are in the nature of Sin, and we sin because of that nature. God has made good, and evil is a distortion of that good. Adam chose to sin, and I inherited that Sin state, and I choose to sin because of it. I am guilty not just because of Adam's choice that condemned me to this state, but also because of my own choosing to sin. We see this pattern in the world in a sense. I have a parent who does drugs, I live with the effects of a parent who does drugs. As a child, I become a drug user, like my parent before me, and I love drugs, and choose to do them. I am now an adult, and fully accountable for my own choices, and understand that drugs are wrong, but I continue because I love them, crave them, and am addicted. I love their power to distort. At some point it ceases to be my parents fault, or the state of my circumstances and birth, but my choice, my lust, and my will. All of these things are at work here, and my parents must shoulder the responsibility of their actions in this process, but I am no less guilty, and responsible, for my own actions. My crimes have led me to prison, and I am bound there. I was destined for prison because of my circumstances, and my actions. Now, with the death penalty hanging over me I am condemned. It is my actions that have condemned me. The judge, by his mercy, gives me a pardon. My cell mate, also condemned to die, may not get the same mercy. But as a condemned man he is not somehow entitled to it because I received it. If I receive the judge's pardon, then I walk away 'free' and it is through no power, or derserving work, of my own. This is the best way I can think to explain what I feel the Bible teaches on this subject. In a perfect analogy I suppose I would be the worst, and filthiest of criminals, and the judge would be perfect, holy, and righteous, and offer His own Son to die in my place to pay my debt to society.

I don't know, I hate analogies because I just prefer God's truth in His word. There is so much more to go into really, but I this is where I would start in reponse to your open-ness idea. I just don't see the need for such a thing, and I do believe that it contradicts the Word of God. We are simply at the mercy of God.

 

[JM]

Geneva Bible, 1599

Psalm 37:23 p The steps of a [good] man are ordered by the LORD: and he delighteth in his way.

(p) God prospers the faithful because they walk in his ways with an upright conscience.

37:24 Though he q fall, he shall not be utterly cast down: for the LORD upholdeth [him with] his hand.

(q) When God exercises his faith with various temptations.

 

[Novum]

I do not agree; what you're proposing is possibly the very definition of unscientific. There is no objective, duplicatable evidence in favor of gods or "intelligent entities". No experiment can possibly be run by mankind - even in theory - that would enable us to test whether or not such entities exist. On top of it all, belief in these gods is, by definition, an incredibly - if not exclusively - subjective experience. This alternate proposal of yours fails every test of validity for scientific evidence.

Please tell me what specifically about the scientific method precludes the possibility that the scientific model of the world incorporate, for example, "entities" (I am speaking very very loosely) that embody shall we say (and only by way of example) "moral" properties.

1. Science requires that there exist objective evidence in favor of these entities. There is none.
2. Science requires that we could repeatedly run experiments that demonstrate the existence and behavior of these entities. There are none.
3. Science requires that these entities exist independently of the observer's beliefs (or lack thereof) regarding them. They do not.

Our present model of the world is made of things that do not have any such properties - atoms do not behave in any manner that could be described as "moral".

That, of course, depends on your definition of the word moral. But yes, for most definitions I can think of, atoms are not moral - that is not to say they are immoral, mind you, because that's something else entirely.

But, and I cannot emphasize this enough, it could be the case that some world is put together in such a manner that the most useful model of the world (in the very scientific sense of predicting experimental results) would indeed be based on constructs (entities) that possess a moral character.

Perhaps we could stop right here in favor of getting some additional clarification, because I'm having serious difficulty wrapping my head around what you're proposing. Do you mean that these moral entities would react in shock and horror, perhaps, if we were to show them pictures of starving children? Would they be "happy" if we gave them a microscopic ice cream cone? What do emotions mean to them, and how would we possibly observe or understand their reactions?

I think you are letting the way our world is presently modeled cloud the possibility of other models that are scientific and meet every criteria for a scientific model. It just so happens that our world (presently) does not seem to admit to such a modeling. But you have not provided any argument that shows how this admittedly unorthodox model of the world could not qualify as scientific. Please provide any criteria you wish and I believe I will be able to show how this unorthodox model could qualify as a scientific model - in the right kind of universe.

Let me try to illustrate by a very simple and admittedly crude example. Suppose that every time any person in the world took somebody's life, they were struck dead. No exceptions. I think we might be inclined to propose a model of the world wherein there is a "force" that strikes killers dead. True, this is not a model of the world that is expressed in terms of "low level" building blocks like atoms and gluons. But it makes verifiable predictions about the outcome of experiments. This strikes me as making it a scientific theory of the world.

My simplest response, at least until you respond and I hopefully develop a better understanding of your position, is an obvious one: the universe you describe is, quite simply, not our own. Bad people are not always struck dead, evil people do not always kick puppies, and so on. In fact, I challenge you to find any cause-and-effect event chain that we can say will ALWAYS happen in ALL situations with ONE HUNDRED percent certainty. I honestly can't think of one, offhand.

 

[Novum]

My wording may have been a little imprecise - I merely meant that we have to examine the world and discern its nature. We cannot come to the world with the pre-conceived idea that only that which is demonstrable by objective evidence is "real".

Why not? What do we lose by working off this traditional axiom? Or, more importantly, what do we gain by adopting your worldview? How will science be changed? How will our lives be altered? What good will be done for mankind?

Answering those questions will go a long way towards providing your worldview with some weight.

Having said all this, I realize that you have never claimed that private sense experiences were not real.

So I suspect that this is not an item of controversy between us.....

Correctamundo, as the Fonz said. ;)

Of course, the true nature of sense experiences is one of the great unsolved mysteries of psychology and neuroscience, the answers to which we have only bits and pieces of. I trust that science will one day have those full answers, but today is not yet that day.