Grazer
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- Jun 22, 2012
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Been reading Keith Ward lately over an ongoing discussion over whether God can/does/has changed his mind. Found the below in his book Why there almost certainly is a God It also links in with all the freewill discussions. Apologies for the long quote;
It looks as though God can know the future, change his mind, thereby proving himself wrong, and so causing big logical trouble. But the medieval theologians were very acute logicians, and readily produced many ways of making the definitions consistent. Resolving the alleged contradiction is easy. An eternal being cannot logically change its mind, so it is no restriction on omnipotence that God cannot change his mind. Even an omnipotent being cannot do what is logically impossible. That resolves the issue of contradiction. But as a matter of fact I prefer an alternative solution. The point is that a truly omnipotent being should be able to do new, original, creative things. Creativity and originality are great values, and it would be good for God to possess them. This is a value judgement that, surprisingly perhaps, only became widespread after the 16th century in Europe. Possibly it reflects the growing interest in the ability of technology to change the world for the better, whereas before that it was often assumed that all change was for the worse. As the Duke of Wellington once said, "Reform? Reform?Aren't things bad enough already?" As I previously argued, a being that is necessary in existence and in its essential nature could also be creatively free in many of its particular actions. If it is good for God to be creatively free, then it could well be necessarily true that God is creatively free. If God is creatively free, then God can "change his mind". In that case, omniscience must be taken to mean that God knows everything it is logically possible for one being to know. But no possible being could know what it has not yet decided, or perhaps what it has allowed other beings to decide freely. So there is still no problem with making omniscience and omnipotence consistent. It is perfectly reasonable to adopt a definition of omniscience such that "knowing everything possible" does not include things not yet decided (since that is not possible), and to adopt a definition of omnipotence such that "being able to do everything possible" does not include being able to do things that conflict with the necessary nature of God (like unutterably evil things). Then we can say that there are necessary limits on the things God, as an ultimately necessary being, can do. God cannot do absolutely anything. But since we do not know the inner nature of God, we can not know what the limits of divine necessity are. Presumably God cannot commit suicide, or do evil for its own sake, or change the past. God is nevertheless omnipotent, because God is the only source of finite existence, and can do the maximum that any possible being can do. What God cannot do is laid down by the necessities of the divine nature, which no possible being could evade. That is as much as we can reasonably ask of a definition of omnipotence.
It looks as though God can know the future, change his mind, thereby proving himself wrong, and so causing big logical trouble. But the medieval theologians were very acute logicians, and readily produced many ways of making the definitions consistent. Resolving the alleged contradiction is easy. An eternal being cannot logically change its mind, so it is no restriction on omnipotence that God cannot change his mind. Even an omnipotent being cannot do what is logically impossible. That resolves the issue of contradiction. But as a matter of fact I prefer an alternative solution. The point is that a truly omnipotent being should be able to do new, original, creative things. Creativity and originality are great values, and it would be good for God to possess them. This is a value judgement that, surprisingly perhaps, only became widespread after the 16th century in Europe. Possibly it reflects the growing interest in the ability of technology to change the world for the better, whereas before that it was often assumed that all change was for the worse. As the Duke of Wellington once said, "Reform? Reform?Aren't things bad enough already?" As I previously argued, a being that is necessary in existence and in its essential nature could also be creatively free in many of its particular actions. If it is good for God to be creatively free, then it could well be necessarily true that God is creatively free. If God is creatively free, then God can "change his mind". In that case, omniscience must be taken to mean that God knows everything it is logically possible for one being to know. But no possible being could know what it has not yet decided, or perhaps what it has allowed other beings to decide freely. So there is still no problem with making omniscience and omnipotence consistent. It is perfectly reasonable to adopt a definition of omniscience such that "knowing everything possible" does not include things not yet decided (since that is not possible), and to adopt a definition of omnipotence such that "being able to do everything possible" does not include being able to do things that conflict with the necessary nature of God (like unutterably evil things). Then we can say that there are necessary limits on the things God, as an ultimately necessary being, can do. God cannot do absolutely anything. But since we do not know the inner nature of God, we can not know what the limits of divine necessity are. Presumably God cannot commit suicide, or do evil for its own sake, or change the past. God is nevertheless omnipotent, because God is the only source of finite existence, and can do the maximum that any possible being can do. What God cannot do is laid down by the necessities of the divine nature, which no possible being could evade. That is as much as we can reasonably ask of a definition of omnipotence.
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