Euthyphro’s Dilemma - - Why it doesn’t work

[Novum]

Here's what posted: If we took a poll asking the question among Christian theologians if what this dilemma suggests is possible, you’d find that it isn’t. From Augustine to Aquinas, they respond in unity…â€Âgoodness†is defined by God’s nature and is not an external law or a whim of His will.

Now who's the liar?

You, unfortunately. Note how in your original post, which you quoted here, the word "orthodox" does not appear before "Christian theologians". You have committed the shifting the goalposts fallacy.

Nope. Stop with the pseudo intellectual posturing, it's not becoming. The arguement is this, good is good not do to command but due to God's nature. That's it in a nut shell. The false dilemma is asking is "good" good because God commands it, I respond, no. God commands what is good based upon His nature and not for the sake of something being good.

Once again, you describe the dictionary definition of ethical voluntarism. Where is the disconnect you're having?

 

[JM]

God commands what is good based upon His nature and not for the sake of something being good and that's the disconnect you're having.

It looks like all you want is the last word, so this will be my last post, you can respond and feel happy about that.

:-D

 

[ArtGuy]

Horn #1: Goodness is defined as whatever God does and says. If God said, "Hey, go steal a broom and then use it to beat an old lady to death," then theft and murder would be good.

Horn #2: Goodness is an absolute. God is beholden to it, and thus his authority is undermined. He's not allowed to do anything bad, and thus his omnipotence is compromised. Ha ha, God is not all powerful.

Secret Bonus Horn #3: Goodness is an absolute. God isn't beholden to it at all - he could, at any time, assume human form and start kicking puppies. This would not, however, make puppy-kicking a good thing. This is apparent to God, and this is why God does not endorse puppy-kicking, theft, murder, removing the tags from mattresses that say "Do not remove!", and so on. God isn't beholden to a higher law, God chooses to abide by it because God is good. It's not in his nature to commit evil, and so he doesn't. Thus goodness still has meaning, God still has free will, and all is well.

 

[DivineNames]

As for DN, we have a history. He plagues me with questions but refuses to answer any of mine. We never have a meaningful exchange because he refuses to have an equal exchange, he wants to sit on the outside and ask questions and never offer anything in return.

You talk nonsense and contradict yourself. (Or your own source at least.) That is probably why we don't have "meaningful exchange".

 

[DivineNames]

Horn #2: Goodness is an absolute. God is beholden to it, and thus his authority is undermined. He's not allowed to do anything bad, and thus his omnipotence is compromised. Ha ha, God is not all powerful.

??

 

[Novum]

Well, I guess JM got tired of defending his position and refusing to explain his argument in more detail.

Horn #2: Goodness is an absolute. God is beholden to it, and thus his authority is undermined. He's not allowed to do anything bad, and thus his omnipotence is compromised. Ha ha, God is not all powerful.

Secret Bonus Horn #3: Goodness is an absolute. God isn't beholden to it at all - he could, at any time, assume human form and start kicking puppies. This would not, however, make puppy-kicking a good thing. This is apparent to God, and this is why God does not endorse puppy-kicking, theft, murder, removing the tags from mattresses that say "Do not remove!", and so on. God isn't beholden to a higher law, God chooses to abide by it because God is good. It's not in his nature to commit evil, and so he doesn't. Thus goodness still has meaning, God still has free will, and all is well.

In Horns 2 and 3:

- Goodness is an absolute
- God upholds goodness regardless of the reasons why
- God therefore does not commit evil

JM's problem was that he simply could not differentiate ethical voluntarism from his own position. But yours is a little different.

In short, it is irrelevant what God's reasons are for upholding goodness. Completely irrelevant. All that matters is his action, which, in this case, is upholding what you have admitted is an outside standard of goodness. My issue with your argument is that I don't see any meaningful difference between the second horn and your position.

 

[ArtGuy]

In short, it is irrelevant what God's reasons are for upholding goodness. Completely irrelevant. All that matters is his action, which, in this case, is upholding what you have admitted is an outside standard of goodness. My issue with your argument is that I don't see any meaningful difference between the second horn and your position.

I typically see this argument brought up as a means of attacking the notion that God is both omnibenevolent and omnipotent. The second horn is generally used to demonstrate that God is not omnipotent, because he is not able to commit evil. I submit that being unable to commit evil is different than being unwilling to commit evil.

If I wanted to, I could go home tonight and kill my wife. It is within my power. But I will never choose to do this, for a host of reasons, including that I love my wife, and that I do not want to murder people. I will thus never actually kill my wife, but such a statement should not be confused with the position that I am somehow physically barred from killing her. The fact that murder is within my capability makes it more meaningful that I choose not to. It is something commendable. It is not commendable, contrarily, that I will never assasinate Abraham Lincoln. I couldn't do that if I wanted to, because he's already dead.

Similarly, the fact that God could choose to commit evil, but never actually would, is commendable. As an omnipotent being, anything is within his power. As an omnibenevolent being, there are some things that he will nevertheless refrain from doing. The distinction between horns 2 and 3 is subtle, yes, but it's also important.

 

[Novum]

Similarly, the fact that God could choose to commit evil, but never actually would, is commendable. As an omnipotent being, anything is within his power. As an omnibenevolent being, there are some things that he will nevertheless refrain from doing. The distinction between horns 2 and 3 are subtle, yes, but they are also important.

I feel like we're getting a little off-topic. If god is omnibenevolent, then, as you point out, there are some actions that he will refrain from doing. He will therefore not commit or command acts of outright evil.

It seems like the same problem that JM was having. How is this at all different from ethical voluntarism - that good is good because it is performed and commanded by god?

 

[ArtGuy]

It seems like the same problem that JM was having. How is this at all different from ethical voluntarism - that good is good because it is performed and commanded by god?

Because with ethical voluntarism, if God theoretically decided to kill a nun, then that would make nun-killing good. With my version, that would mean God was committing an evil act. EV provides no assurance that the rules will not suddenly change on God's whim.

 

[Novum]

Because with ethical voluntarism, if God theoretically decided to kill a nun, then that would make nun-killing good. With my version, that would mean God was committing an evil act. EV provides no assurance that the rules will not suddenly change on God's whim.

Err, yeah. I think I mistyped that earlier post - it's the second horn that I was having trouble distinguishing from your version.

 

[DivineNames]

ArtGuy, are you a Christian?

 

[Drew]

I am partial to secret bonus horn #3. As I kind of implied in the thread about atheism and morality, I think that morality is a kind of "system property" that enjoys existence independent of God in the same way that "sound engineering" enjoys the property of existence, even if engineers do not follow it. In the same way that the engineer is "free" to follow sound engineering practice, so God is free to choose to act morally.

 

[JM]

It begs the question egregiously because it presupposes that moral good exists as an objective attribute. Consequently, it's a false dilemma. Good is God and God is good. It's viciously circular because it's a statement of identity. All propositions of identity are circular. Since God's nature is defined and described in the Bible as being tautologically good, Euthyphro's dilemma is completely inapplicable.

It is written, God alone is good (Matt. 19:17).